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Kenneth Culp Davis has graced the occasion of his retirement
from the University of Chicago this year with a volume in adminis-
trative law that is useful and yeasty. Although 700 pages long, it
reads faster than law books by others generally do. It functions
partly as a 1976 Supplement updating the 1970 Supplement to
Davis's multivolume Administrative Law Treatise.1 It will also be
incorporated into a new edition of the Treatise which is slated to
issue, starting in mid-1977, at the rate of one volume per year, with
annual pocket-part supplements. But it stands independently, and
is rightly given its own title-Administrative Law of the
Seventies2-because it is a stocktaking that captures the develop-
ments of a demidecade, a time of flux and fast-paced reexamina-
tion.
First, some personal disclaimers. Unlike Samuel Johnson, who
said he would rather praise the works of Carlyle than read them, I
readily accepted the invitation to review Davis's book because I
wanted to ensure that I would read it before it was cited in a
brief-or before I needed help on a particular matter. But I had not
anticipated that the book would be so complimentary of the judicial
efforts of this reviewer and of the court he serves. I would surely
specify recusal if this were a litigated case. But I resist the tempta-
tion to lean over backwards: this is a fine book despite the fact that
Professor Davis finds many of our opinions rewarding. On the other
hand, I will insert some "on the other hands."
I
Perhaps the most notable feature of this Supplement is that it
can profitably be read as a book. This is a rare and difficult accom-
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (1958).
2 Hereinafter cited as 1976 SUPPLEMENT.
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plishment in the case of treatises. One can read the book straight
through and gain a reasonably faithful portrait of today's adminis-
trative law, warts and all. To be sure, it helps to have had at least
modest previous exposure. But if the corpus of the law in general is
substantially restated every twenty years, as Justice Holmes ob-
served, then this is a field where five years of restatement tells a lot.
Because this is a Supplement, Professor Davis is able to focus
on the most quickly evolving and hence the most interesting topics
in administrative law. His prose is usually clear. He deftly summa-
rizes and quotes from the leading cases without obstructing the flow
of the text. And as we have come to expect, Professor Davis con-
stantly stimulates the reader with his vivid opinions, his exuberant
delight with effective innovation, and his tutorial rebuke of what he
considers judicial mistakes.3
The book should prove especially useful to one beginning re-
search or thinking about a particular problem. Although it is some-
times lacking in the close analysis typical of the better law review
articles, the book does call attention to the leading articles, as well
as the major developments outside the courts, such as those in legis-
lation and in actions of the Administrative Conference.' On vir-
tually every topic, the book provides a ready synthesis of recent
opinions together with predictions about the course of the law.
Davis does an excellent job of identifying the major trends.
II
While Professor Davis stretches a wide canvas for his landscape
of administrative law, his main focus in the Supplement is on such
fundamentals as undue delegation of power to agencies,
adjudication, and most of all rulemaking.
The traditional rule of "undue" delegation of power has been
that delegation of legislative power is unconstitutional. That doc-
trine is near death. I share with Professor Davis the approach that
tolerates broad delegations by the legislature yet seeks to avoid
bureaucratic despotism and caprice by stressing the rule of adminis-
trative law that requires the executive to develop standards to guide
administrative action. In support of this approach, Professor Davis
kindly calls attention to, and approves of, my analysis of precedents
and doctrines, 5 notably in my 1971 Amalgamated Meat Cutters
See, e.g., 1976 SUPPLEMENT at viii.
Unfortunately, these developments are not collected in a table, as are the cases.
1976 SUPPLEMENT § 2.00, at 22.
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opinion' and a law review gloss. 7 Amalgamated also stressed the
requirement of fair procedures and included an indica-
tion-apparently overlooked by Davis8-that the President is an
"agency" under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)9 and is
governed, unless exempted, by its notice-and-comment procedural
requirements for rulemaking.
Although the nondelegation doctrine has faded, it reemerged in
new garb in a 1974 Supreme Court decision' 0 that construed the
scope of a law's delegation narrowly in order, it seems, to avoid the
nondelegation question." And I find significant and pregnant the
recent post-Supplement decision holding a Civil Service Commis-
I Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 758 (D.D.C. 1971) (uphold-
ing the delegation to the President, in the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, of broad
authority to fix prices, rents, wages, and salaries).
' Leventhal, Principled Fairness and Regulatory Urgency, 25 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 66
(1974).
Davis states that "if the President or his office is exempt from the APA," it will have
to be for some reason other than the "literal words" of the Act. He notes that the issue was
avoided in Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 1976 SUPPLEMENT § 1.01-2, at 1.
In Amalgamated, the court made its view reasonably clear. See 337 F. Supp. at 761: "The
leading students of the APA, whose analyses are often cited by the Supreme Court, and who
on some matters are in conflict with each other, seem to be in agreement that the term
'agency' in the APA includes the President-a conclusion fortified by the care taken to make
express exclusion of 'Congress' and 'the courts.'" The opinion went on to say that it need
not consider whether an action could be brought against the President eo nomine-for it could
be brought against the official to whom the President delegated the power vested by Congress
in the President.
A subsequent opinion bit the bullet of declaring that an action would lie, and indeed a
writ of mandamus would issue, against the President eo nomine, when the President himself
took responsibility for the action, and there was no delegee. It chose to confine itself to a
declaratory judgment "at this time" but remanded to the district court for further proceed-
ings after a reasonable time. National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
5 U.S.C. § 551 (1970).
" National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974). The Court held
that the fees to be imposed on CATV companies should be measured only by the "value to
the recipient" even though the language of the general statute allowing fee setting by federal
agencies permits consideration not only of "value to the recipient" but also of "public policy
or interest served, and other pertinent facts." 31 U.S.C. § 48 3 (a) (1970). In Federal Energy
Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2295 (1976), a case involving license fees
imposed by the President on oil importers, respondents relied on National Cable Television
to support an undue delegation argument. Id. at 2302 n.10. The Court distinguished National
Cable Television on the ground that the statute in that case was less specific in its instruction
than the instant statute, which gave power to the President to adjust the import of any article
he deems necessary "so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security."
19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (Supp. IV, 1974). A better rationale for distinguishing National Cable
Television would stress the need for greater flexibility in empowering the President to deal
with such matters as national security and foreign relations. See, e.g., United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
11 415 U.S. at 342.
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sion regulation against hiring aliens invalid, on the ground that,
while the federal government had authority to pursue a national
policy toward aliens, this authority could be exercised only by spe-
cific action of Congress or the President, and is not within the grant
of power to the Commission to maintain an efficient service.'2
If the nondelegation doctrine is a dim though still flickering star
in the firmament of administrative law, the requirement of reasoned
decision making is a brilliant sun. Under that requirement an
agency must develop standards and adhere to them without dis-
crimination; it may reserve the latitude to change standards delib-
erately, but not to ignore them casually or haphazardly. This theme
pervades Professor Davis's 1976 volume, as it has dominated his
teaching and thinking. Our views are entirely congruent, and I ap-
preciate his numerous passages' 3 approving the short course in ad-
ministrative law inserted in my Greater Boston opinion." That was
an agonizing decision, in which I followed the doctrine that requires
a judge to uphold an agency's action that he disapproves, so long
as, in accordance with reasoned decision making, there was no viola-
tion of law or abuse of discretion.
The topic of reasoned decision making is too broad for extensive
commentary here. But it is entirely appropriate to point out Profes-
sor Davis's influential and humane insistence, on becoming ap-
palled during the 1960s by the laxity of the United States Board of
Parole, that the Board be governed by such elements of administra-
tive law as open standards and statements of reasons for parole
denials.'1 Following Davis's lead, the Administrative Conference is-
sued a resolution to the same effect following its investigation and
debate.'" The courts soon provided relief, a state court having led
the way on the ground of fundamental fairness." In its 1974 Childs
opinion, '8 our circuit required reasons for parole denial, overhauling
a 1964 decision.'9 Davis scores me one point over the majority, which
" Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 96 S. Ct. 1895 (1976).
1976 SUPPLEMENT §§ 6.13-1, 10.04, 11.00, 17.07-4.
" Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
,s K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969). The requirement of
reasons was also called for by the U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT ON CORRECTIONS (1967).
", Administrative Conference Recommendations 72-3: Procedures of the United States
Board of Parole, 25 AD. L. REV. 531, 534 (1973).
27 Monks v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 230, 277 A.2d 193 (1971). This decision
is striking because, according to Davis, state courts generally lag behind the federal courts
in the evolution of administrative law. 1976 SUPPLEMENT at iv.
' Childs v. Board of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
" Richardson v. Rivers, 335 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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relied on constitutional grounds, for having rested my concurrence
on the APA as sufficient. But he thinks I may have gone too far in
saying that reasons are a fundamental requirement, essential to the
integrity of the administrative process. He notes that certain func-
tions may not require reasons. Still, my perhaps cryptic notation
that "agencies are not fungible" was meant to suggest both that
agencies cannot all be put under the same procedures and that no
one agency need have the same procedure for all its functions.
One quarter of this book deals with the "flood of law about
rulemaking."
The foremost fact about 1970-75 administrative law devel-
opment is the huge new body of law dealing with rulemaking
procedure and review of rulemaking. . . .Most of that mate-
rial is not merely new law on old problems. Much of it involves
groping by perceptive judges on problems that reach into the
fundamentals of law and government ...
Even though the law of rulemaking procedure and of judi-
cial review of rulemaking is less settled now than it was five
years ago, the reasons are that the courts are inquiring more
deeply and laying the foundations for inventing better legal
machinery. 20
"Groping" is the right word. As a judge I often feel like the Stephen
Leacock knight who mounted his horse and rode off in all directions.
Avoiding any temptation to travel all the trails of the Supple-
ment in this review, I shall confine my observations on rulemaking
to "hybrid" hearings, a path already well trodden by others and
generally handled with good judgment by Professor Davis.
The notice-and-comment procedure of informal rulemaking
prescribed by the APA is, in Professor Davis's view, "one of the
greatest inventions of modern government. 21 It is at least extremely
useful, and typically much to be preferred to adjudicatory trial-type
procedures. But when should the latter be used? In my American
Airlines opinion 21 in 1966, the court en banc, confronted with a
vexing question involving the impact of a rule on the authority
conferred by outstanding licenses, concluded that doubtful cases
should be classified as rulemaking. The court also observed, how-
ever, that oral procedures, either legislative or with cross-
20 1976 SUPPLEMENT at ix, xvii.
21 Id. at 168.
22 American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 843 (1966).
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examination, might be required if shown to be necessary in particu-
lar cases. Various subsequent decisions have also suggested that oral
procedures, although not necessary in the instant situation, might
be necessary in some situations. 23 Professor Davis remarks that the
decisions do not fairly indicate when cross-examination might be
necessary, beyond vague references to "critical issues" and "specif-
ics." ' 24 Fair enough, except perhaps that judges proceeding cau-
tiously in an unmarked field are not faithless to principles of judicial
administration, and will fill in the gaps of generalities as specific
cases provide occasion.
My 1971 opinion in Holm v. Hardin25 is the single instance of a
decision requiring an opportunity for oral presentation, though pos-
sibly only a legislative-type hearing, before an agency. What con-
cerned the court was that the Secretary of Agriculture's order
adopted, with regard to a technical question, a recommendation
that was unfavorable to importers and had been fashioned by a
committee composed solely of domestic producers. The court sus-
pected that a procedure that permitted no opportunity for oral
presentation to agriculture officials "is a seed bed for the weed of
industry domination. ' 2 Professor Davis expresses doubt that oral
presentation is always a more effective protection than written pres-
entation.27 But a recent article by Professor Stephen Williams, who
was commissioned by the Administrative Conference to study hy-
brid procedures, convinces me that the oral hearing was instrumen-
tal in discrediting the recommendation of the domestic producers
committee. 2
In any event, Professor Davis is quite right in saying that cross-
examination is granted as the rare exception rather than the rule.29
He is probably also right in saying that the danger to administrative
proceedings is too much rather than too little of such trial-type
procedure. Indeed, he has been a leading spirit in the Administra-
tive Conference against any rigid doctrinal requirement of oral pres-
I See 1976 SUPPLEMENT § 6.01-5, at 183-84. The Supplement cites, inter alia, Long Island
R.R. v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 490 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (Friendly, J.); Virgin Islands Hotel
Ass'n v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Auth., 476 F.2d 1263 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1067 (1973); O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974); American Public Gas
Ass'n v. FPC, 498 F.2d 718, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
2, 1976 SUPPLEMENT 190.
449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1016.
21 1976 SUPPLEMENT 180.
21 Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal
and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CH. L. REV. 401 (1975).
21 1976 SUPPLEMENT § 6.01-5.
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entation in rulemaking. On the other hand, in its 1976 spring meet-
ing the Conference acted upon Professor Williams's submission by
passing a recommendation that first, acknowledged that the courts
had identified instances when procedures beyond notice and com-
ment were salutary and, second, outlined procedures to be consid-
ered by agencies involved in the problems of hybrid hearings .3 Fur-
thermore, when Congress recently enacted a law on the power of the
Federal Trade Commission to issue substantive rules, it provided for
cross-examination whenever the Commission considered it requisite
for a full and true disclosure of "disputed issues of material fact."3'
III
Apart from his full treatment of traditional administrative law,
Professor Davis devotes much time and effort in the Supplement to
the nature of police and prosecutorial discretion and to the goal of
preserving an open society by regularizing the exercise of that dis-
cretion. 32
Professor Davis knows that his approach is unusual. In an early
chapter, on search and seizure and self-incrimination under the
fourth and fifth amendments, he acknowledges that the decisions in
the 1970s on the governmental investigating power tend to deal with
police, grand juries, and legislative inquiries and judicial proceed-
ings that are "outside of what is traditionally administrative law."
But his concern is a serious one, for he discerns a trend "from consti-
tutional prohibition of governmental snooping into business records
to constitutional protection of such snooping. ' 34 And since, as he
puts it, "[t]he legal limits on investigating are the same whoever
the public investigator is," he offers by way of compromise an
"admittedly brief or skimpy treatment of investigation law devel-
oped to govern other investigators. ' 3 Thus, for example, he ushers
in cases like Wyman v. James,36 upholding the requirement that
welfare recipients consent to "home visitation" by caseworkers.
While I share Professor Davis's concern over a number of devel-
opments in fourth amendment law, the Supreme Court seems will-
' Administrative Conference Recommendation 76-3: Procedures in Addition to Notice
and Opportunity for Comment in Informal Rulemaking, 41 Fed. Reg. 29,654 (1976).
1' 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b) (Supp. IV, 1974), discussed in 1976 SUPPLEMENT § 6.01-6, at 191.
32 See K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975), reviewed in Friendly, Book Review, 44 U. CHI.
L. REV. 255 (1976).
1976 SUPPLEMENT 40.
3' Id.
' Id.
" 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
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ing to avoid treating all inspectors and inspections as fungible. The
most far-reaching decisions are those tolerating warrantless
searches lacking particular factual predicates, such as inspections
of businesses conducted under relatively strict and special licenses.17
Meanwhile, however, the Court has preserved and perhaps extended
the principle of Camara,3" in which it overruled prior law that fire,
health, and housing inspection programs could be conducted with-
out a warrant .
3
In administrative law terms, what may be required is a "regula-
tory view" of the fourth amendment. The Supplement calls atten-
tion, for example, to Judge Oakes's opinion in Barbera,40 which
invalidates groundless immigration searches and develops the idea
of deliberative rulemaking by central administrative authority. The
opinion naturally draws on Professor Davis's own approaches" and
Professor Amsterdam's more fleshed-out proposals.2 A related the-
sis, stressing the need that fourth amendment objectives be incorpo-
rated into the basic value system of law enforcement policies, has
surfaced in the recent opinion in Stone v. Powell. 4 3
Speaking broadly to the problem of police and prosecutors,
Professor Davis advances a general argument" that while the con-
duct of these officials must necessarily be rooted in the exercise of
discretion-including intuition and experience-it can, through
rulemaking, be removed from the domain of blank-check preroga-
'7 These searches were approved by Justice Douglas, no less, in Colonnade Catering
Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), involving control of the liquor industry, and in
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), extending that control to firearms.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
" The Court here, balancing the necessities of regulation with security against arbitrary
invasions of privacy, permitted area warrants based on appraisal of conditions in the area.
See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
" United States v. Barbera, 514 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1975).
" See K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JusTicE 94-95 (1969).
12 See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 423-
29 (1974).
4 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976). Stone has been analyzed primarily in terms of its ruling forbid-
ding the raising of fourth amendment claims on collateral attack of state convictions. But
the Court states explicitly that it is not, at least now, abandoning the exclusionary rule on
direct appeal. Justice Powell has been a notable skeptic of the view that the exclusionary rule
deters individual police officers from those fourth amendment violations that they believe are
a part of reasonable police work. In Stone, Justice Powell not only indicates familiarity with
Professor Amsterdam's views, he casts the "more important" justification of the exclusionary
rule in terms of encouraging "those who formulate law enforcement policies, and the officers
who implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value system." Id.
at 3051. I read this as relating to the kind of generalized advance thinking that is served by
rulemaking.
" See, e.g., 1976 SUPPLEMENT §§ 4.00-.20.
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tives of individual officials and kept within channels informed by
the experience of superiors."
Professor Davis has made us all think more pointedly about
these matters, and some of the best pages of this book are summa-
ries of observations made in his books on the nature of police discre-
tion and its exercise,4" and on the development abroad, particularly
in Germany, of controls on prosecutorial discretion.4 7
My own view is that Professor Davis's ideas will be useful but
cannot be invoked broadside, and must be examined for feasibility
in incremental steps. An interesting example is my opinion in
United States v. Ammidown,5 holding that a prosecutor's discretion
to plea bargain is judicially reviewable for abuse. As the Supple-
ment fairly comments, my opinion uses conventional administrative
law concepts in allowing a judge to disapprove the prosecutor's ac-
tion only if the judge states reasons for his finding of abuse.49
Administrative law continues in flux, and in some confusion.
Professor Davis does a great deal to shed light-and also, I fear,
some heat, for I acknowledge concern that this taskmaster has been
overdemanding of court opinions" and that some of his harsh grades
may weaken his influence. A lack of precision in opinion writing,
though hardly praiseworthy, should be judged not only in view of
time pressures but also by the salutary rule that general expressions
must be appraised in their contexts. Courts welcome but cannot
match the precision of professors.
We rightly fear the bureaucratic elite, the unleashed adminis-
trative monster. But the legal doctrines that would avoid these evils
cannot clog the wheels of government.
The figure of speech, however, that has led me to refer to agen-
,s I commend an effective presentation in this vein by my colleague Judge McGowan,
for the thesis that police rulemaking should be considered as an alternative to the exclusion-
ary rule. McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REv. 659 (1972).
" K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975).
17 K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA (1976).
' 497 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
The Supplement presents this case as staking out the power of a judge to review the
prosecutor's discretion, but actually the holding reflects the applicable federal rules of crimi-
nal procedure that qualified the absolute power of a prosecutor and specified the need for the
trial judge's approval of a nolle prosequi.
11 This is particularly true of his extreme condemnations of Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 149
(1974), and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 1976 SUPPLEMENT
at viii, §§ 5.03-4, 6.13-1, 11.00, 16.00-1, 28.16, 29.01-3.
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cies and courts as a partnership5 may properly be broadened to
identify a pluralistic collaboration that embraces the commentary
of professors. To the ongoing dialogue Professor Davis has consis-
tently made a valued contribution. His 1976 volume gives a hand-
hold to old-timers and newcomers alike.
5' E.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
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